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Experience from events of sovereign debt restructuring over the last decade exemplifies that 
the prevailing process is mainly shaped by exchange-offer launched by the debtor. This 
suggests that negotiations for changing the repayment terms of the debt take place in an 
Ultimatum Game which centres virtually the whole bargaining power on the debtor side. 
Creditors vote according to reservations values that might be influenced by fairness 
consideration both vis-à-vis the debtor and their fellow creditors. And as fairness is usually a 
highly subjective influence this can result heterogeneity of reservation values which might 
impede effective intra-creditor coordination for the benefit of the debtor.  
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I.  Introduction 
Avoiding conflict of interest among creditors has always been a central aspect in the debate 
regarding an institutionalized restructuring process for an insolvent sovereign debtor (see 
Bank of England 2005 as well as Roubini and Setser 2004).
  Currently, this debate focuses on 
a market-based approach that centers on the inclusion of so called Collective Action Clauses 
(CACs) in emerging market bonds. These clauses would allow a supermajority of creditors to 
bind together in order to form a holdout minority in a proposed restructuring of defaulted 
debt. The goal is to secure inter-creditor equity by eliminating the incentives for a free ride. 
However, according to the nature of majority voting, the bound minority looses its bargaining 
power in the negotiation process. CACs thereby implicitly allow the fact that the negotiation 
process that occurs between the debtor government and the creditors will focus on the pivotal 
creditor whose acceptance will complete the necessary supermajority. Therefore, the majority 
voting might cause conflicts of interest among heterogeneous creditors (Bratton and Gulati 
2003).  
How do some creditors differ from others? As demonstrated by the Argentinean debt swap in 
2005, this question seems to be more complex than some comments regarding the merit of the 
market-based approach without any third party moderation or coordination would suggest, 
(e.g., Kletzer 2003). In the course of this largest debt restructuring in history, different 
creditor groups, e.g., institutional investors, retail investors, vulture funds, proved to embrace 
substantially different views regarding both how to handle the negotiation process and what 
an acceptable exchange-offer should look like.
2 Ultimately, 24% of the creditors, especially 
the groups of vulture funds and foreign retail investors, rejected the offer made by the 
                                                 
2 For a survey on the Argentinean default and its restructuring see Blustein (2005) and Damill et al. (2005).   3
Argentinean government.
3 As this paper suggests, these two groups possessed totally different 
reasons to reject the offered repayment terms. While the vulture funds specialize in free-
riding, the retail investors might have regarded the offer as unfair. This suggests that fairness 
considerations can be an additional source of potential heterogeneity among creditors. 
Findings from experimental game theory support the argument that heterogeneity in economic 
decision-making can be related to fairness considerations. For example, in the classical 
Ultimatum Game, a proposer makes a suggestion regarding how to divide a joint payoff, and a 
responder either accepts or rejects the proposal. A rejection of the proposal results in zero 
payoff for both players. Some responders accept small amounts, while others depart from the 
perfect payoff maximization by rejecting shares even larger than 20 percent (Camerer 2003: 
49).  
Taking this into consideration, this paper shows that an exchange-offer proposed by the 
debtor leads to reservations that might be influenced by fairness. Defining fairness as the 
aversion of inequality, we conclude that inequality of payoffs between debtor and creditors 
and also among different creditors or creditor groups can impact the outcome of the 
restructuring process. Our main contribution is to identify a potential source of heterogeneity 
among different creditors or creditor groups and the impact that this heterogeneity might have 
on the effectiveness of intra-creditor coordination in the course of different voting procedures. 
This paper begins with the bargaining framework surrounding the renegotiation process 
between a debtor government and its private bondholders (II.). Based on the experiences 
regarding heterogeneity from the Argentinean debt restructuring (III.), the analysis introduces 
inequality aversion as an additional cause of heterogeneity (IV.). This will lead to an analysis 
                                                 
3 Vulture funds usually buy defaulted sovereign debt on the secondary market far below face value and initiate 
litigation for full repayment. As this might threaten the success of the whole restructuring process, some 
examples of settlement payments to these funds have occurred. Retail investors, in contrast, consist mostly of 
individuals who invested their pension savings in Argentinean bonds shortly before the default.    4
of the resulting creditor payoffs in an exchange-offer with inequality among accepting and 
rejecting creditors (V.) and the employment of majority voting (VI.) as compared to a 
bondholder meeting (VII.).  
II.  Restructuring as an Ultimatum Game 
Sovereign debtors receive credit from the international capital markets in order to finance 
governmental investments that are intended to foster the economic development of the 
economy. The repayment of the debt is guaranteed by tax revenues, which are expected to 
grow in the future. However, sometimes expectations are too high, or reality is unfavorable, 
which might result in the debtor traveling on a debt path that is not sustainable. A 
characteristic of this type of unsustainable development is that the present value of future 
repayment obligations is higher than the present value of future repayments that can still be 
regarded as sustainable in both economic and political terms. The debtor country is in a state 
of insolvency that necessitates restructuring the debt including a haircut that the private 
creditors must take on their claims. The goal is to return the debtor back to a sustainable debt 
path and thereby back to solvency. 
The main difference for sovereign debtors from the insolvency of a private company is that 
the future repayments do not represent the maximum payment capability but rather the 
debtor’s maximum payment willingness, which is strongly influenced by political sentiments. 
The reason for this is that sovereign debtors are not liable to any legal jurisdiction, which has 
led to very few cases of successful legal enforcement of contractual claims.
4 Therefore, 
besides the threat of litigation, the incentive to avoid measures of economic punishment from 
creditors – like the temporal exclusion from the international financial markets – encourages 
the fulfillment of these obligations (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981). Political pressure can also act 
                                                 
4 See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006: 72-73) for a list of such cases.   5
as an incentive for contractual conformity. Such pressure might come from multinational 
financial institutions or governments of countries that host the leading international financial 
centers. 
This shows that the barrier to the insolvency of a sovereign debtor is at least partially 
determined by debtor government discretion. For example, in the case of the latest 
Argentinean debt restructuring, the debtor government under president Nestor Kirchner 
signaled its willingness to aim at an average primary budget surplus for the subsequent 25 
years of 2.6% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (GCAB 2005).
5  However, the Global 
Committee of Argentina Bondholder (GCAB), which operated as an umbrella representation 
body for various committees of private creditors, based their valuation on a primary budget 
surplus projection of 3.3% GDP for the same time period. Based on the estimates of the 
committee, this difference in the primary surplus projections would have had an impact on the 
present value of future repayments equivalent to USD 17 billion. This shows that the process 
of sovereign debt restructuring includes the bargaining of a specific future repayment plan in 
a range between “minimum payment willingness” and “maximum payment capability”.
6 The 
difference can be regarded as a “pie” that must be divided between the debtor and the 
creditors. Various models in bargaining theory reveal that the bargaining framework is the 
key to the division of the pie. Which side is allowed to make the first proposal? Who makes a 
second or even third proposal? How costly are rejections? Will an opportunity be provided for 
communication prior to making proposals? Is an independent third party involved for 
                                                 
5 “GCAB Investor Roadshow Presentation – July 2004”, available at www.gcab.org. This figure is calculated 
using identical assumptions for GDP growth.  
6 Most of the models on sovereign debt restructuring recognize this difference between payment capacity and 
willingness (Haldane et al. 2002, 2005 and Ghosal and Miller 2003). The most prominent argument in favor of 
this difference is to provide an incentive for the debtor to undertake costly economic reforms because a positive 
difference would mean that the debtor country would participate in any improvement of the economic conditions 
of the country.     6
arbitration? These are the crucial issues that are organized by the bargaining framework, and 
they are essential to determine the bargaining power between the debtor and creditors 
(Camerer 2003: ca. 151-194). 
How is bargaining currently structured? Different versions are suggested in the literature. 
Actually, this is the most crucial aspect of the discussion regarding an institutionalized 
mechanism for an orderly restructuring process of sovereign debt. The reason for this dispute 
is that the structure of bargaining has been changing as the debt profile of sovereign debtors 
evolves, particularly from bank loans to bonds as the primary source of external financial 
resources.  
Motivated by the Latin-American debt crises of the 1980s, the advocates of a pure market 
based approach– which means no third party intervention into the crises resolution – are on 
one side, like Kletzer and Wright (2000).
7 They assume that the bargaining power is one-
sided and located with the creditors since they would propose the terms of any revised 
repayment schedule to the debtor.
8 However, the experience with sovereign debt restructuring 
over the last decade tells a different story. Accompanied by the rise of bond markets as the 
major source for emerging market financing, the restructuring procedure has changed 
                                                 
7 In a sense, the case of the Argentinean debt restructuring should have been the first resolution process without 
major (third party) official sector intervention, e.g., by the IMF or other multinational institutions, and, therefore, 
should have been an example of this still evolving market-based restructuring process. However, due to 
commitment tactics, the case of the Argentinean debt exchange-offer introduced a caveat to this. The 
Argentinean exchange-offer received a participation rate of 76%. Since the bonds that were included in the 
restructuring did not provide the possibility for majority voting, the Argentinean government must receive all old 
bonds to resolve the default. Hence, continuing to launch further (possibly higher) exchange-offers until all 
bonds in default are exchanged would be a common procedure. However, through the inclusion of a “most 
favored creditor clause” in the new bonds and the passage of a law that prohibits the government from making a 
higher offer, Argentina generally committed itself to not making higher offers. This causes opacity with regard 
to the future of the rejecting creditors and thereby to the development of the market-based restructuring process 
(Porzecanski 2005, Scott 2006, and Miller and Thomas 2006).  
8 Actually, this is also a necessary assumption to sustain their renegotiation-proof reputation equilibrium.   7
substantially toward a process of exchange-offers proposed by the debtor to its creditors 
(Roubini and Setser 2004). This offer mostly comprises the swap of old bonds for new ones 
containing revised financial terms for repayment. The creditors then can solely choose 
between acceptance and rejection.  
Miller and Garcia-Fronti (2003) and Dhillon et al. (2006) seized this topic and analyzed the 
Argentinean debt restructuring of February 2005 in the tradition of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 
by applying the concept of a Rubinstein Game with alternating offers. In this game, the 
creditor can also solely decide between acceptance and rejection of the offer made from the 
countervailing party. However, if he rejects the proposal in the current period, he becomes the 
one to propose in the next period. So, both parties, proposer and responder, know that if the 
game moves to the next round of bargaining, they will switch positions.  
When applied to the case of the Argentinean debt restructuring, the authors interpreted the 
reaction from the GCAB after the debtor made its first offer in Dubai (2004) to be such an 
alternating offer.
9 However, the final result of the Argentinean debt restructuring questions 
the interpretation of a Rubinstein Game. The committees recommended its members to reject 
the second offer made by the debtor and tried to get involved in a bilateral dialogue by 
offering what they regarded as acceptable terms. However, the Argentinean government 
simply ignored these proposals and continued with their unilateral approach. Ultimately, a 
large majority of creditors accepted the Argentinean proposal despite the lack of dialogue 
between the debtor and the creditors (“A victory by default? - The successful restructuring of 
Argentina's debts has set a painful new benchmark for creditors”, The Economist, 5. March 
2005). This means that, although the committees might have had a different perception of 
their role, they simply did not have the power to become a bargaining participant in such a 
                                                 
9 The GCAB, as the representation body of private creditors at that time in line with the credit markets, strongly 
dismissed this repayment offer and demanded more than double the size of the proposal.   8
Rubinstein Game.
10 Apparently, the debtor government did not care about the representation 
bodies as long as the majority of creditors would accept their offer. However, this does not 
mean that a debt restructuring can never become a Rubinstein Game, but it would require a 
high degree of effective coordination among different creditor groups. The representation 
body is a serious player in the bargaining process only if it can make a credible threat to 
impose sanctions, such as advancing to the next renegotiation round in case the offer is too 
low. An example of a representation body of private creditors that exhibited this type of 
credibility is the Bank Advisory Committees from the 1980s. They guaranteed a high degree 
of coordination among the creditor banks during the restructuring process (Rieffel 2003). 
However, what kind of bargaining framework was used in the case of Argentina? The 
Argentinean government refused to participate in a clearly structured negotiation process but 
rather unilaterally proposed the following two repayment offers: the Dubai and the Buenos 
Aires proposal.
11 The Dubai was merely a public announcement of the key details for a 
possible exchange-offer and was presented in 2004 at the IMF/Worldbank meeting in Dubai. 
These details were strongly rejected by the creditors. The second, slightly improved proposal 
was made at the beginning of 2005 with a six-week tender period, during which 76% of the 
creditors exchanged their old bonds for new ones, thereby accepting an implicit haircut on the 
nominal value, including past due interest, of around 70%. With regards to the bargaining 
framework, these facts suggest an Ultimatum Game framework between the debtor 
government and the creditor side, at least for the creditors lacking a powerful representation., 
                                                 
10 Dhillon et al. (2005) suggested that this disempowerment was at least partially caused by New York 
investment funds that took over as a negotiating counterparty at considerable cost to the average creditor as they 
admit.  
11  Other examples of unilaterally proposed exchange-offers are the debt restructurings in Pakistan (1999), 
Ukraine (1998-2000), Ecuador (1999-2000), Russia (1998-2000), Moldova (2002), Uruguay (2003), and the 
Dominican Republic (2005). For a detailed description of the restructuring terms offered seeSturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer (2006).   9
In contrast to a Rubinstein Game, the positions of proposer and responder remain the same in 
case of rejection in an Ultimatum Game where negotiation rounds advance. Therefore, total 
bargaining power in the next stage will again be on the side of the current proposer. Hence, 
the decisive difference between a Rubinstein Game and an Ultimatum Game is that in the 
latter one only one side makes proposals for the division of the pie. Apart from rejection, the 
receiving side, therefore, has no influence on the shares offered. Actually, the GCAB admits 
this lack of influence in the approach to the second and final offer. In its last investor road-
show presentation, it stated, “Argentina has not engaged in constructive dialogue with leading 
creditor groups. The current proposal does not reflect any input from GCAB.”, GCAB (2005).
  
III.  Heterogeneity among Creditors 
In bargaining theory, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in an Ultimatum Game is quite 
unspectacular. In such a game, the proposing side exhibits the whole bargaining power and 
can, therefore, secure virtually the whole pie. However, why did a majority of creditors accept 
the offer while a minority rejected the offer? This would imply heterogeneous reservation 
values among creditors. Apparently, the groups of foreign retail investors and vulture funds 
must have possessed higher reservation values than the other creditor groups since they 
mostly rejected the offer (Sgard 2005 and Gelpern 2005).  
Haldane et al. (2005) presented a model containing different holdout costs among creditors 
caused by different investment horizons, compensation structures, or different degrees of risk 
aversion. Although not explicitly stated by the authors, the same rationale would also be valid 
for differences in litigation costs (e.g., due to judicial experience) among creditors. These 
different holdout-costs translate into heterogeneous outside options, e.g., net proceeds in the   10
case of litigation.
12 However, as each creditor accepts an exchange-offer only if it is higher 
than his outside option, different reservation values with the lowest holdout cost comprising 
the highest reservation value result. When applied to the case of the Argentinean debt 
restructuring, this argument might be convincing to justify the behavior of vulture funds and 
other so-called bottom-fishers as these investors are highly specialized in the handling of 
distressed debt. However, it is not truly convincing in the case of the retail investors. Actually, 
retail investors tend to have relatively higher holdout-costs as compared to institutional 
investors due to a higher degree of risk aversion or less experience in litigation. Therefore, 
according to Haldane et al. (2005), this creditor group should have an even lower reservation 
value than the institutional investors.  
Therefore, some commentators suggest that the retail investors lacked the ability for 
sophisticated information processing of the economic data (Gelpern 2005 and Salmon 2004). 
This would lead retail investors to a wrong supposition regarding the maximum that could be 
achieved in this type of negotiation process. This uncertainty would be amplified when 
creditors prefer to follow the choice of the majority of creditors but are uncertain about what 
others will do (Engelen and Graf Lambsdorff 2005). Understandably, households often do not 
have the ability and knowledge to realistically asses these issues. Nevertheless, this argument 
is not completely sound because badly informed retail investors may also erroneously accept a 
low offer. Whether an average lack of information increases rejection or not remains 
indeterminate.  
Finally, some sources also argued that the side deals that were offered to some creditor groups 
                                                 
12 Since legal enforcement of debt claims by a sovereign entity is limited, very few cases of successful holdout 
litigation in recent sovereign debt restructurings have occurred (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006 and Miller 
and Thomas 2006). Furthermore, as these cases involved complex legal strategies to achieve the resulting 
enforcement, different litigation costs might be essential in explaining heterogeneity among creditors.   11
would have been a decisive element in this restructuring, thereby leading to heterogeneous 
behavior.
13 Although such deals are hard to judge and are not typically publicly announced, 
such elements surely occurred between the government and the Argentinean pension funds. 
Unquestionably, these deals have influenced the pension funds’ early decision to accept the 
second offer. However, this logically was not solely responsible for a participation rate of 
76% since this would imply that all but the rejecting creditors would have benefited from such 
side deals; this is an argument that is not truly convincing.  
IV.  Fairness and Reservation Values
14 
An alternative argument for the decision by the retail investors to reject the offer made by the 
Argentinean government is that this offer was considered unfair. Experimental game theory 
shows that such considerations influence the economic decisions that people make. Especially 
in the Ultimatum Game framework, the theoretical equilibrium has become a rare result. 
Many experiments have illustrated that on average a 60/40 offer characterizes the results in 
contrast to 99/1  (Berninghaus et al. 2006: 221-224). An unfair offer of 80/20 is rejected in 
about 25% of all cases. This relation can further change due to factors like gender, academic 
major, race, testosterone level, or cultural background (Camerer 2003: 64-74). Based on these 
findings, some models from the field of behavioral game theory have evolved aiming to 
capture preferences for equity as opposed to pure income maximization. Precisely these 
considerations can impact the renegotiation of sovereign debt.  
                                                 
13 E.g., Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005: 40) noted the following in their assessment of the quasi-par bond 
that was offered in the Argentinean debt restructuring: “This bond was issued in indexed pesos only and targeted 
specifically to local pension funds, which were coaxed into an agreement under which they received the quasi 
par bond along with regulatory benefits.” 
14 Although somewhat limiting, the terms fairness and social preferences are used interchangeably in the course 
of this analysis.   12
In order to analyze this impact of fairness considerations on the creditor decision, we apply 
the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which achieved great success in explaining 
experimental results. This model is based on a consideration of inequality aversion — envy in 
case of disadvantageous inequality and guilt in case of advantageous inequality. We assume a 
repeated Ultimatum Game, which, due to a high discount on future payments, boils down to a 
simple decision by the creditor to accept some unfairness now or see the pie shrink. 
Apparently, this decision is similar to a one-shot Ultimatum Game.
15 
A pie of value 1 is to be divided between a debtor and each of his n+1 creditors. The debtor 
offers ω  ∈(0,1) of the pie to each creditor.
16 In case the creditor rejects the offer, the debtor 
will make a new offer, ω ω > ) , in the next period. However, since the continuation of 
bargaining incurs costs to both parties, the future bargaining results are discounted by 1 ≤ δ .
17 
We assume that the discount rate is rather large, so that ω δ ω ) > . This leads to the following 
value function for creditor i if he accepts the exchange-offer: 
(1)  ) )( 1 ( ) 2 1 ( ) ( ω δ ω β ω α ω ω ) − ′ − − − − = a V i i
a
i  
This value function consists of three components. The first describes the pure monetary value 
of the exchange-offer. Concerning the three subsequent terms, some working assumptions 
were necessary. In laboratory experiments, players observe the income of other players and 
view their own payoffs in comparison to these. In reality, such a reference group of other 
                                                 
15 Experimental studies have shown that, due to a reputation argument, the average behavior is more competitive 
and that conflict rates are higher when subjects play against the same opponent repeatedly (Slembeck 1999). For 
simplicity, however, we disregard these reputation effects. 
16 The debtor in default is unlikely to offer more than half of the pie, which is a result that is seldom observed in 
experimental Ultimatum Games. 
17 A discount rate below unity indicates that the pie is decreasing over time so that an efficient outcome requires 
an immediate settlement. However, as Dhillon et al. (2006) showed in their analysis, the pie is possibly 
increasing over time as the debtor experiences a substantial economic recovery. In this situation, waiting from 
both sides would be value enhancing so that efficiency requires a settlement in the future.    13
players is more difficult to determine. We posit that each player (creditor) compares his own 
income to the income that the debtor obtains from him but feels indifferent about how much 
money the debtor obtains from others.
18 Thus, if a creditor is given an unequal share, i.e., less 
than 5 . 0 = ω , he envies the debtor by (1 2 ) i α ω − . The parameter  0 > i α  captures the aversion 
of the creditor for disadvantageous inequality (envy). This parameter is multiplied with the 
difference of the debtor’s income from bargaining (1-ω ) and that of the creditor (ω ).  
Each player (creditor) also compares his own income to that of his fellow creditors. The logic 
could be that all creditors’ actions help to discipline the debtor. Therefore, free-riding on the 
joint goal of sanctioning the debtor might induce sentiments of guilt, which is captured 
by (1 )( ) i a β ωδ ω ′ −− ) . The parameter  i β  depicts the aversion to advantageous inequality vis-à-
vis other creditors (guilt). Standard assumptions are  1 0 < ≤ i β  and i i α β ≤ . Guilt is felt toward 
those creditors that reject the offer, leaving them the reduced income ω δ ) . Their absolute share 
is denoted by n a ≤ ≤ 0 , but, for the sake of convenience, we write the relative share  n a a / = ′  
with 1 0 ≤ ′ ≤ a . We introduce the working assumption that the representative creditor cares as 
much about comparisons of his own income to that of all other creditors as comparisons with 
the debtor. This is an arbitrary assumption. While empirical research would have to determine 
its adequacy, we feel that it is not totally at odds with intuition. Due to the working 
assumption, the last term is multiplied bya′. Obviously, if 1 = ′ a , fairness has an influence on 
the value for the creditor, except when 5 . 0 = ω , which indicates that the debtor offers an equal 
sharing. For the sake of simplicity, we disregard exchange-offers 0.5 ω > . Theoretically, such 
offers might induce creditors’ feelings of guilt vis-à-vis the debtor, but little relevance exists 
for such concerns.  
                                                 
18 This judgment seems firmly based on experimental findings that third party income has little impact on the 
outcome in Ultimatum Games (Camerer 2003: 80-81).   14
In contrast, if the representative creditor rejects the offer, he obtains: 
(2)  ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ω δ ω α ω δ δ α ω δ ω ) ) ) − ′ − − − = a V i i
r
i  
Comparable to the value for acceptance, this term includes the monetary value of the (higher) 
offer in the next period and the envy that the creditor will bear vis-à-vis the debtor. However, 
as the present value of this future offer is below the current offer, the creditors that reject the 
offer in the current period will also envy the accepting fellow creditors. This is depicted in the 
third term and depends on the share of fellow creditors that accepted the current offer. 
Comparing the value function in (1) and (2), the decision that is taken by the fellow creditors 
clearly influences the payoffs of acceptance or rejection.    
The creditor will accept the exchange-offer made by the debtor if: 
(3) 
) ( ) 2 ( ) )( 1 ( ) 2 1 ( ω δ ω α ω δ δ α ω δ ω δ ω β ω α ω ) ) ) ) − ′ − − − ≥ − ′ − − − − a a i i i i  
)] 1 ( ) 2 ( 1 [
) 1 (
a a i i
i





ω δ ϖ )  
Proposition 1: As a creditor’s concern for envy increases, that is, the higher i α , the offer by 
the debtor needed for inducing acceptance also increases. The proof follows directly from 
equation (2). 
Proposition 2: Creditors will base their decision whether to accept the exchange-offer on the 
behavior of their colleague creditors. Acceptance by others may induce acceptance by the 
representative creditor.  
Proof: If 1 = ′ a , the expression simplifies to:  
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In contrast, if 0 = ′ a , the second term in (2’) increases due to the decreasing denominator: 
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− ) , the representative creditor bases 
his decision on that of other creditors. He will follow the herd. This effect relates to his dislike 
for a difference in his income as compared to that of his fellow creditors. He dislikes rejecting 
if others obtain higher income by accepting. However, he also dislikes accepting while the 
others engage in jointly penalizing an unfair debtor. The following alternative explanation for 
why creditors “run with the herd“ has been suggested by Engelen and Graf Lambsdorff 
(2005): The fixed costs of lawsuit and political campaigns can be shared among creditors, 
reducing individual costs and the willingness to reject, which increases as more colleague 
creditors accept an offer by the debtor.  
We note in passing that the more diverse the creditors are with respect to the aversion to 
inequality, the more heterogeneous are their reservation values. As retail investors are in 
general perceived to react more emotionally than institutional investors, this might suggest a 
possible explanation for their behavior.  
V.  Herding and Intra-Creditor Fairness 
When the debtor extends an exchange-offer, he can use certain contractual elements in order 
to support acceptance among creditors. For example, in the Argentinean debt restructuring, 
the debtor employed a most favored creditor clause, which is contingent bonus payments and 
exit consents with the goal to achieve a more favorable outcome.  
The most favored creditor clause should guarantee to every creditor that accepted the offer in   16
the first place participation in any potential improvement that would be offered to the 
remaining creditors. So the accepting creditors would receive an additional payment in the 
case that some holdouts continued to successfully negotiate with the debtor. However, this 
clause was not flawless as it includes ways to circumvent this contractual commitment. 
Additionally, the Argentinean government announced the extension of the volume of the most 
preferred par bonds that can be interpreted as a contingent bonus arrangement. Because the 
par bonds offered were distributed among the accepting creditors, this was an incentive to 
favor a participation rate just above the threshold for the larger amount but not higher as this 
would reduce their personal share of par bonds. Finally, the debtor used exit consents to 
support the acceptance of his exchange-offer by threatening to change the non-financial terms 
of the bonds. As control of a super-majority of the bonds is usually sufficient, even under U.S. 
law, to change the non-financial terms of the bond (e.g., the listing on a secondary market), 
this is a threat to a rejecting minority. A debtor may fail to bind in this minority in the change 
of the financial terms. However, he can threaten to modify non-financial terms and reduce the 
value of their bonds. Therefore, the question of how much influence can fairness in the form 
of inequality aversion have on the effect of those contractual elements is interesting.  
All these additional contractual arrangements employed in the Argentinean debt restructuring 
had one common element, which is that all would increase the difference of nominal payoffs 
to creditors that fail to vote collectively. Hence, all of these clauses aim at increasing the 
inequality of payments between accepting and rejecting creditors. Consequently, fairness 
considerations in the form of intra-creditor inequality aversion alter the reservation value of 
the respective creditor and foster herding behavior: 
(4) 
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In this case, the term ε  captures the effect of contractual elements that aim to increase the 
inequality in payments if creditors can not coordinate on a collective vote. As all of these 
contractual elements have the same impact, this ε  can be interpreted either as a bonus 
payment to the accepting creditor due to the effect of a most favored creditor clause or as a 
loss to the rejecting creditors due to the effect of exit consents. Thereby, if ε  is interpreted as 
a bonus payment for the accepting creditors, the first two terms on the left hand side would be 
altered as the bonus payment would increase the monetary value of the current offer. This 
would make accepting even more favorable. However, for simplicity, we abstain from this 
detailed differentiation between certain contractual elements. As for the herding effect, only 
the difference in payoffs between accepting and rejecting creditors is decisive. This shows 






a ), the effect of herding is amplified so 
that the reservation value decreases, which benefits the debtor. 
Proposition 3: If the debtor employs contractual elements that increase the difference in 
payoff between accepting and rejecting creditors, then these elements will foster herding 
behavior. 
Proof: If 1 = ′ a , the expression (3) gives:  
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In contrast, if 0 = ′ a , the term increases to: 
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A comparison of the above terms with (3’) and (3’’) shows that, as long as 0 > ε , the herding 
effect among creditors is amplified. The reason for this is that, in the case that all fellow   18
creditors accept the offer (a’=1), rejecting becomes even less favorable for the single creditor 
than in (3`) due to the disadvantageous effect of the additional contractual elements. 
Therefore, the single creditors will accept an even lower current exchange-offer if he believes 
that all fellow creditors will accept as well. In contrast, for the case that all creditors reject the 
current offer, the single creditor will need a higher exchange-offer to induce him to diverge 
from his fellow creditors. The amplification of this herding results from the fact that deviation 
from the majority of the fellow creditors is more costly as the additional contractual elements 
widen the payoff difference between accepting and rejecting creditors.  
VI.  Fairness and Majority Voting 
After years of intensive debate, experts agree that the employment of majority voting is a 
crucial element to avoid conflict of interests among creditors or creditor groups. The concept 
of majority voting is based on the desire to protect the restructuring from the potentially 
disruptive influence of vulture funds. This should be achieved by the coercive inclusion of the 
holdout creditor in the debt swap as long as a sufficient majority of creditors accepted the 
restructuring terms. Motivation for this is based on the fact that, as long as the legal claims are 
at least theoretically enforceable, every creditor can veto the restructuring and demand the full 
repayment. So if the group of vetoing creditors is small enough, the debtor may find that 
paying these holdouts in full is advantageous and then finishes the restructuring with the other 
creditors. However, since this free-riding by a minority contradicts the concept of intra-
creditor equity, the inclusion of CACs – and thereby a majority voting – should help to 
mitigate a potential conflict of interests among creditors.
19 Therefore these CACS are the key 
                                                 
19 Some scholars question whether CACs increase the efficiency of the renegotiation process. For example, 
Haldane et al. (2005) presented a model of bilateral bargaining with two-sided information asymmetries. In this 
context, the inclusion of CACs reduces the probability of reaching an agreement in the first period, thereby 
increasing the inefficiency of the bargaining process.   19
element of the market-based approach of crises resolution. 
CACs usually allow a certain supermajority to change the financial terms and thereby reduce 
the contractually agreed debt repayments. So, if there are CACs included in the bond 
contracts, the debtor targets the supermajority threshold to achieve success with his exchange-
offer. As we have demonstrated, the debtor, therefore, needs to offer at least the reservation 
value of the pivotal creditor who is necessary to fulfill this supermajority. Following from 
equation (3), as the remaining creditors are bound once the necessary acceptance rate is 
reached, the pivotal creditor’s decision becomes: 
(5) 
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The decisive difference for equation (3) is that the pivotal creditor implicitly votes for the rest 
of the rejecting creditors because if he accepts the financial terms as offered, all rejecting 
creditors are bound. In contrast, if he rejects, the debtor can not gain the necessary support so 
that the financial terms of the bond remain unchanged. Therefore, the pivotal creditor can 
never feel guilt for the rejecting creditors, so the term on the left side lacks this influence, 
which reduces his reservation value. 
Proposition 4: When CACs are employed, intra-creditor inequality aversion reduces the 
pivotal creditor’s reservation values. The proof follows directly from the difference between 
equations (3) and (5).  
So, the employment of majority voting clauses reduces the nominal amount that is necessary 
to make the pivotal creditor indifferent between accepting and rejecting as compared to a 
situation without such clauses.    20
VII.  Fairness in a Bondholder Meeting 
However, the exchange-offer is not the only possible structure for a bilateral restructuring 
process. Alternatively, the voting can take place in a bondholder meeting. The main 
difference between an exchange-offer and such a meeting is that, in a bondholder meeting, 
creditors can conditionally accept an offer based on the decisions of other creditors. 
Therefore, the set of feasible strategies is increased. Acceptance would be conditioned 
commonly on a supermajority also accepting. Therefore, the choice of the pivotal creditor 
affects the payoffs to all fellow creditors regardless of their acceptance or rejection of the 
offer. If majority voting is employed, this pivotal creditor is the one that completes the 
threshold level.
20   
The pivotal creditor, therefore, determines collective behavior because an acceptance rate 
below the voting threshold is not sufficient to change the financial terms of the bond. The 
other accepting creditors get the new terms proposed only if the pivotal creditor accepts. In 
contrast, in an exchange-offer, the creditors who accepted receive the new bonds independent 
of the pivotal creditor’s decision. So, in an exchange-offer, the acceptance rate can become a 
variety of values. In a bondholder meeting, however, the overall acceptance can only be either 
zero or one. This means that, as the pivotal creditor’s decision applies to all fellow creditors, 
acceptance becomes favorable when: 
(6) 
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Proposition 5: If creditors vote in a bondholder meeting, the pivotal creditor’s reservation 
                                                 
20 If no majority voting is employed, then the creditor with the highest reservation value is the pivotal creditor as 
unanimity among creditors is required to change the financial terms of the bond.   21
value is not affected by herding among creditors. The proof follows directly from the 
difference between (5) and (6).  
The lack of herding is caused by the fact that the pivotal creditor’s decision is binding for all 
fellow creditors irrespective of whether he accepts or rejects the terms proposed. As revealed 
by (6), this increases the reservation value demanded by the pivotal creditor and, thus, the 
overall offer that a debtor must make. The reason rests with the fact that a rejecting pivotal 
creditor can not experience envy towards accepting colleagues, as his decision forced them 
equally into rejection.  
VIII.  Conclusion 
Up to now, the debate about an institutionalized process for restructuring sovereign debt has 
generally remained vague regarding the question about the specific structure of the 
negotiation processes between a debtor and its private creditors. However, the most prominent 
common element of all restructuring processes over the last few decades between a sovereign 
debtor and its private creditors has been that the debtor launches an exchange-offer that can be 
either accepted or rejected by the creditors. This suggests that the bargaining framework takes 
the form of an Ultimatum Game with only minor outside options since third party 
enforcement seems to be limited. As commonly found in an Ultimatum Game, the equilibrium 
strategy for the single creditor is characterized by a reservation so that the creditor accepts any 
exchange-offer above that threshold level. Furthermore, taking into consideration the 
experiences from the most recent Argentinean restructuring process, these reservations might 
be heterogeneous among different types of creditors. 
Following the arguments made in this essay, heterogeneity concerning fairness consideration 
might be a possible influence that can lead to different reservation values. The more the   22
creditor envies the debtor in an unequal sharing of the surplus from the resolution of the debt 
dispute, the higher his reservation value becomes. Additionally, the more he dislikes the 
unequal treatment as compared to his fellow creditors who accept the current offer, the lower 
his reservation value becomes. This implies that his incentive to run with the herd is higher. 
The application of additional contractual elements (e.g., most favored creditor clause, 
contingent bonus payments, or exit consents) enables the debtor to lower his restructuring 
costs by fostering the herding effect among creditors.  
Further, this herding can have an effect on the results of different voting procedures because 
the prevailing concept of a market-based approach allows the debtor to decide which way he 
prefers to approach his creditors for restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt. He can 
propose his demanded changes of the financial terms of the bond either by making an 
exchange-offer to swap old for new bonds or calling for a bondholder meeting. As we 
indicated, only the latter process is free of herding as the bondholder meeting does not allow 
for an unequal treatment of creditors irrespective of their voting behavior. This might suggest 
why debtor countries seem to have a clear preference for exchange-offers since a bondholder 
meeting supports coordination among different creditors or creditor groups. 
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